Summary: Ma (1996) studied the random order mechanism, a matching mechanism suggested by Roth and Vande Vate (1990) for marriage markets. By means of an example he showed that the random order mechanism does not always reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) result is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented -and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 -is not correct. The mistake in the calculations by Ma (1996) is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as "symmetric." JEL classification: C78 For a description of the marriage model we refer to Roth and Vande Vate (1990) . A marriage market is denoted by (M, W, P ) where M = {m 1 , . . . , m a } is a set of "men," W = {w 1 , . . . , w a } is a set of "women," and P is a preference profile. The set of stable matchings for (M, W, P ) is denoted by S(P ). We now recall the random order mechanism.
The algorithm ends in exactly n := 2a steps and its outcome is a random stable matching RO(P ), generated by a sequence of agents (i 1 , . . . , i n ). The set of possible sequences of agents equals the set of permutations of all agents denoted by Q. Hence, |Q| = n!. Moreover, for any µ ∈ S(P ), let Q µ ⊆ Q be the (possibly empty) set of sequences that lead to µ. Denote q µ = |Q µ |. The random order mechanism induces in a natural way a probability distribution P over the set of stable matchings: for any µ ∈ S(P ), the probability that RO(P ) = µ equals p µ = q µ n! . By using the following example, Ma (1996) showed that the random order mechanism may not reach all stable matchings. Although Ma's (1996) theorem is true, we show that the probability distribution he presented -and therefore the proof of his Claim 2 -is not correct. Knuth's (1976) Example. Let (M, W, P ) with a = 4 and P given below.
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). Below we show that this is not true by calculating the correct probability distribution: ( ). The mistake in the calculations is due to the fact that even though the example looks very symmetric, some of the calculations are not as "symmetric," in other words Ma's (1996) statement on page 380 that "the proofs for the remaining cases are similar." is not correct. In spite of the mistake, our computation is still based on Ma's (1996) idea of analyzing sequences of agents backwards, i.e., considering the last agent that enters, subsequently the last but one agent that enters, etc.. The difference is that we provide more detailed discussions and justify the (restricted) use of "symmetry." ) by checking which stable matchings the random order mechanism induces for various sequences (i 1 , . . . , i 8 ). Whenever we refer to a unique stable matching obtained for a marriage market not containing all agents, we calculated the man-optimal and the woman-optimal matching for the "submarket" using the deferred acceptance algorithm and detected that they coincide (this calculation is not included in the proof). Furthermore, whenever we "satisfy" a blocking pair, the (unique) proposing agent does not propose to agents that are better than his/her previous match (all these proposals would be rejected).
Case a: m 1 enters last; i.e., the sequence of agents is (i 1 , . . . , m 1 ). There are only two stable matchings µ and µ when the set of agents consists of all women W and the remaining three men {m 2 , m 3 , m 4 }:
When m 1 enters last, he proposes to the single woman w 1 , who accepts. So, matching µ implies matching µ 1 and matching µ implies µ 3 . 2 (i 1 , . . . , m 3 , w 1 , m 1 ) 120 -a. 4.3 (i 1 , . . . , m 4 , w 1 , m 1 ) 120 -a. 4.4 (i 1 , . . . , w 2 , w 1 , m 1 ) -120 a.4. 5 (i 1 , . . . , w 3 , w 1 , m 1 ) -120 a. 4.6 (i 1 , . . . , w 4 , w 1 , m 1 ) -120 a.4
(i 1 , . . . , w 1 , m 1 ) 300 420 a. 5.1 (i 1 , . . . , m 2 , w 2 , m 1 ) 60 60 a. 5.2 (i 1 , . . . , m 3 , w 2 , m 1 ) 120 -a. 5.3 (i 1 , . . . , m 4 , w 2 , m 1 ) 120 -a. 5.4 (i 1 , . . . , w 1 , w 2 , m 1 
